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Mutual Recognition and the European Court of Justice: 
The Meaning of Consistent Interpretation and 
Autonomous and Uniform Interpretation of Union 
Law for the Development of the Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters
Matthias J. Borgers
Professor, Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, VU, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1. Introduction
Since the Tampere European Council, now ten years ago, hard work has been 
done within the third pillar of the European Union (EU) on innovation or, 
rather, streamlining of the legal assistance relationships between the Member 
States. This process is being completed along two lines. First of all, the traditional 
legal assistance system, in which States render legal assistance on request, has been 
transformed into a system of mutual recognition. The idea behind the principle 
of mutual recognition is that the European Member States are to a great extent 
required to render assistance to one another. This means that – ideally – few or 
no grounds for refusal may exist. This is partly intended to allow the necessary 
procedures to be standardised and run quickly. The second innovation is closely 
connected with this: within the EU, legal assistance is arranged mainly by means 
of framework decisions. A framework decision – in view of its definition in Article 
34(2)(b) of the EU Treaty – gives rise to the obligation for the Member States to 
adjust their national legislation in accordance with the contents of the framework 
decision. Cooperation between the Member States based on the principle of mutual 
recognition is realised primarily through harmonisation of legislation. 
Such cooperation based on the principle of mutual recognition is designed at 
different levels. First of all, framework decisions are adopted at European level by 
the Council, in which the procedures to be followed for the different forms of 
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cooperation are worked out in more detail. The principle of mutual recognition 
is, of course, the main guideline in this regard. Although it cannot be denied that 
compromises are made during the negotiation process, for example on accepting 
or adding grounds for refusal, which are sometimes at odds with that principle. 
The effect of this is, in the words of Mitsilegas, ‘the substantial watering down of 
automaticity in mutual recognition’, even though this has a positive reverse side 
at the same time:
The paradox in this context is that scepticism with regard to mutual recognition as an effective 
method of European integration in criminal matters has been accompanied by the reach of the 
principle in an ever wider range of aspects of the domestic criminal justice systems, which now 
include evidence, probation and alternative sanctions and the transfer of sentenced persons.1
In other words: precisely by not considering the principle of mutual recognition 
a rigid dogma now and then, it appears possible to allow the scope of application 
of that principle to grow.
Adoption of the framework decision is followed – self-evidently – by the process 
of implementation at national level. Framework decisions are binding on the 
Member States with respect to the results, but the power is left to the Member 
States to chose the form and means (according to Article 34(2)(b), EU Treaty). 
This may well limit the freedom the Member States have to implement framework 
decisions, but in practice the situation can easily occur that certain differences arise 
in the implementation rules of the different Member States.2 Those differences can 
arise, for example because a term in a framework decision is ‘translated’ into an 
equivalent term in national law, but also because Member States include conditions 
that cannot explicitly be found in a framework decision. An example of this is the 
inclusion of a human rights exception in legislation to implement the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) framework decision. Even if it is explicitly provided that the 
framework decision does not diminish the obligation to respect fundamental rights 
and fundamental legal principles, such a human rights exception is not explicitly 
considered a ground for refusal in the framework decision. So it is doubtful whether 
a Member State has an independent power to do so.
In applying the national rules by which framework decisions are transposed, 
national courts are required – as ensues from the Pupino judgment3 – to apply 
1) V. Mitsilegas, ‘The third wave of third pillar law: which direction for EU criminal justice?’, 
European Law Review 2009, pp. 523–560, at p. 560.
2) Cf. M.J. Borgers, ‘Implementing Framework Decisions’, Common Market Law Review 2007, pp. 
1361–1386.
3) ECJ, Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285.
  101
Borgers / European Journal of Crime,  
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 18 (2010) 99–114
the national law as far as possible in conformity with the relevant framework 
decision. In that context, the competence to request the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) to give a preliminary ruling is very important. Whether national 
courts have competence to do so, and if so, which national court is entitled to 
such competence, depends on whether or not a declaration was made within the 
meaning of Article 35(2) EU Treaty. By preliminary ruling, the ECJ can give an 
interpretation of (among others) the rules pertaining to mutual recognition as laid 
down in the various framework decisions. In giving its preliminary rulings, the ECJ 
directs the way in which the national courts apply the implementation legislation 
in their Member State. In this way, the ECJ potentially plays an important role 
in the development of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters.
This paper centres on the question of the way in which the ECJ gives shape 
to this role. It should be noted first of all in this regard that the number of cases 
in which the ECJ has ruled on issues relating to mutual recognition in criminal 
matters has been small up to now. The cases at hand nevertheless give a relatively 
clear idea of how the ECJ construes its role in these cases. In the following, I 
will deal first in a more general sense with the obligation to interpret national 
legislation in conformity with framework decisions (Section 2) and with the 
meaning of the concept of uniform and autonomous interpretation in explaining 
Union law (Section 3). I will then discuss the case law of the ECJ on the ne bis in 
idem principle of Article 54 CISA (Section 4) and on the term ‘staying’ in Article 
4(6) of the EAW Framework Decision (Section 5). Consecutively, I will illustrate 
the importance of the case law of the ECJ on the basis of a Dutch case in which 
the issue was brought up concerning the extent to which the competent Dutch 
authorities may require that the text or a translation of the text of the applicable 
statutory provisions must be enclosed with a European arrest warrant (Section 6). 
Finally, I will end with several conclusions and – in view of the Treaty of Lisbon – an 
outlook for the near future (Section 7).
2. Conforming Interpretation
The definition of the framework decision in Art. 34(2)(b) of the EU Treaty is for 
the most part in line with the definition of this legal instrument in Art. 249(3) 
of the EC Treaty. Framework decisions and directives are binding as to the result 
but leave the power to choose the form and methods to the national authorities. 
A difference between the two definitions is that Art. 34(2)(b) of the EU Treaty has 
an addition which is absent in Art. 249(3) of the EC Treaty. This addition reads: 
‘They [read: framework decisions] shall not entail direct effect.’ The drafters of 
the EU Treaty made this addition so the case law of the ECJ on the direct effect 
of directive provisions implemented late, incorrectly or not at all would not apply 
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to framework decisions. This expresses what the drafters viewed as the intergov-
ernmental, non-community nature of the third pillar. Somewhat less clear, but 
absolutely plausible, is that the Member States have also wanted to keep out the 
indirect effect of framework decisions in the form of conforming interpretation. 
In the aforementioned Pupino judgment, the ECJ – notwithstanding the 
above-mentioned intention of the Treaty signatories – accepted the obligation to 
interpret national legislation in conformity with framework decisions. The ECJ puts 
forward four arguments to this effect: the similarity between treaty law definitions 
of directives and framework decisions; the useful effect of the preliminary ruling 
procedure under Art. 35 EU Treaty; the development of the European Union into 
a cohesive and solidary organization; and the principle of loyal cooperation this 
judgment introduced for the third pillar. It would be going too far to subject the 
arguments of the ECJ to a more detailed analysis here, but one may note that the 
Pupino judgement was very important in characterising the legal nature of the 
third pillar. The ECJ gives the third pillar an autonomous nature in this judgment, 
through which the third pillar law has effect in the national law of the Member 
States under its own conditions. This judgment in fact preludes the predominantly 
community regime as laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon for police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.
In giving the Pupino judgment, the ECJ sought to be in line with the already 
much longer existing doctrine of interpretation in conformity with directives. Partly 
in view of the case law on the interpretation of national law in conformity with 
directives, roughly four characteristics of the obligation of consistent interpreta-
tion can be distinguished, whether the interpretation of directives or framework 
decisions is concerned. The first is the obligation of consistent interpretation. If a 
provision of national legislation is within the scope of application of a directive 
or framework decision, the court must interpret that provision in conformity 
with that directive or framework decision. This also means, and this is the second 
characteristic, that the court must use the interpretation methods customary in its 
national law in such a way that the result intended by the directive or framework 
decision is achieved. This could mean that the court must interpret in a way that 
is not supported by or is even at odds with the legislative history.4 Thirdly, the 
obligation of consistent interpretation is not limited to provisions by which a 
directive or framework decision has been transposed, but extends to the whole of 
national law. Even a provision that has already existed for a longer time must be 
interpreted consistently if it falls within the scope of application of a subsequently 
4) ECJ, Case C-371/02, Björnekulla Fruktindustrier, [2004] ECR I-5791; ECJ, Case C-379/01 to 
C-403/01, Pfeiffer et al., [2004] ECR 2004 I-8835.
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adopted directive or framework decision. The fourth characteristic is the limitation 
of the obligation of consistent interpretation. The court is not obliged to interpret 
national law contra legem in order to achieve the result intended by a directive or 
framework decision. In Community law and Union law, legal certainty and non-
retroactivity must be respected. However, these principles do not automatically 
prevent an extensive interpretation of national law in order to arrive at a consistent 
interpretation.5
This outline of the characteristics of the obligation of consistent interpretation 
makes it clear that national courts play an important part in the realization of 
European law. It also demonstrates the importance of requesting and giving 
preliminary rulings by the ECJ. In this way, a more detailed interpretation is given 
to the relevant provisions of European rules and regulations that are of decisive 
importance for the application of national legislation.
3. Uniform and Autonomous Interpretation
The ECJ uses different interpretation methods in its case law in interpreting 
European law.6 Literal and contextual interpretation of provisions of European 
legislation plays a dominant role in this respect. This means that the ECJ rarely 
pays attention to the legislative history of provisions,7 but concentrates on the 
uniform and autonomous meaning of the relevant rules and regulations. This 
approach is evident from the judgment in the Kozłowski case.8 In this case, the 
ECJ interpreted one of the provisions of the EAW Framework Decision for the 
first time. This was Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework Decision, which includes 
an optional ground for refusal of surrender for the purpose of executing a custodial 
sentence. If an EAW is issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence 
or detention order, surrender may be refused if the requested person ‘is staying 
in, or is a national or a resident of ’ the executing Member State, and this State 
undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order itself. The specific question 
was put before the ECJ of when a person is ‘staying’ in a Member State and when 
a person is a ‘resident’.
5) ECJ, Case C-321/05, Kofoed, [2007] ECR I-5795.
6) For an overview see André Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach, Antwerp/
Oxford/Portland: Intersentia 2009, pp. 135–147.
7) S. Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent, Band I, Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2001, pp. 346–349; S. Schønberg & K. Frick, ‘Finishing, Refining, Polishing: on the 
Use of Travaux Préparatoires as an Aid in the Interpretation of Community Legislation’, European 
Law Review 2003, pp. 149–171.
8) ECJ, Case C-66/08, Szymon Kozłowski, [2008] ECR I-6041.
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After an initial exploration of the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’, the ECJ em-
phasised that the definition of these terms cannot be left to the judgment of each 
Member State. In doing so, the ECJ used a generally formulated ground: because 
of the uniform application of Union law and the principle of equal treatment, an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation must be given to the wording of provisions 
of Union law, in so far as those provisions do not refer to national law for further 
interpretation. When such an autonomous and uniform interpretation is given, 
account should be taken of the context of the relevant provision and the purpose 
of the rules and regulations concerned. This is a notable ground, in the sense that 
the ECJ almost literally falls back on case law on the interpretation of terms in 
directives. In different language versions, only ‘Community law’ is replaced by 
‘Union law’. In the English version of the Kozłowski judgment, ‘Community 
law’ is still written instead of ‘Union law’. The ECJ does not explain why the 
same applies to framework decisions as to Community directives. But this step is 
not surprising. This does not only have to do with the far-reaching equation of 
the legal instruments framework decision and directive in the Pupino judgment. 
It also has to do mainly with the function of the preliminary ruling procedure 
in Third Pillar law: the preliminary ruling procedure is intended to guarantee a 
uniform application of Union law. The obligation to interpret national legislation 
in conformity with framework decisions, as accepted in the Pupino judgment, 
would not amount to much if no uniform interpretation could be given to rules 
of framework decisions.9 
In the Kozłowski case, the ECJ worked out the starting point of autonomous 
and uniform interpretation in more detail in relation to (Article 4(6) of ) the 
EAW Framework Decision. It comes down to the fact that the surrender system 
as laid down in the EAW Framework Decision is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition and is therefore largely obligatory in nature. Not surrendering is pos-
sible only on the basis of the limitative grounds for non-execution included in the 
framework decision. Should it be left completely up to the Member States to give 
shape to the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’, which are part of an optional ground 
for refusal, that ground for refusal could have divergent meanings in the different 
Member States. This would impede the effectiveness of the surrender system. For 
that reason, the Member States are not authorised to give a broader interpretation 
of terms with a uniform meaning. I will return to this in section 5.
It is remarkable, for that matter, that the ECJ mentioned ‘Member States’ 
without reservation, by which the ECJ apparently expressed that all Member 
9) S. Peers, ‘Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it 
wrong?’ Common Market Law Review 2007, p. 916.
  105
Borgers / European Journal of Crime,  
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 18 (2010) 99–114
States are bound by the uniform interpretation given to Article 4(6) of the EAW 
Framework Decision. The Pupino judgment gave rise to the question whether 
the judicial authorities of the Member States which did not accept the possibility 
under Article 35(2) of the EU Treaty to submit preliminary enquiries are also 
required to interpret their legislation in conformity with framework decisions and 
are thus bound by the uniform meaning of terms in framework decisions.10 The 
Pupino judgment in fact already contains the answer to this question. In it, the 
ECJ referred to ‘the binding nature of framework decisions’, entailing that national 
judicial authorities must interpret national law in conformity with them, without 
differentiating according to whether a declaration within the meaning of Article 
35(2) of the EU Treaty was made or not. In the Pupino judgment, the ECJ pointed 
out further that all Member States, whether or not they had made such declarations, 
are entitled to file statements or written comments with the Court of Justice. The 
ECJ elaborates this line of reasoning in the Kozłowski judgment by assuming that 
the Member States are bound by the uniform meaning of Article 4(6) of the EAW 
Framework Decision. What is more, the obligation of the judicial authorities of 
the Member States to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity with 
the wording and purposes of framework decisions and, in doing so, to focus on 
the uniform meaning of terms in framework decisions actually results in an erga 
omnes effect of preliminary rulings. Consequently, the rule in Article 35(2) of the 
EU Treaty only says something about the competence of the national courts to 
request preliminary rulings, and nothing about their being bound by Union law.11
4. Ne bis in Idem
A good illustration of the fact that the ECJ pays hardly any attention to the legisla-
tive history of provisions but focuses on the uniform and autonomous meaning 
of the relevant rules, is given in the ECJ case law on Article 54 of the CISA. 
This concerns the rule that persons convicted of an offence by a final judgment 
in one Member State cannot be convicted of the same offence again in another 
Member State. In the legislative history of this provision, one Member State (the 
Netherlands) proposed to have the ne bis in idem rule also apply to out-of-court-
settlements by the prosecution. That proposal, however, was rejected at the time 
by other Member States involved in drafting the CISA. Viewed in this way, Article 
54 of the CISA only relates to final court judgments.
10) Ch. Herrmann, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtskonforme Auslegung nationalen Rechts in Strafverfahren’ 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2005, p. 438.
11) M. Pechstein, EU-/EG-Prozessrecht, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007, pp. 463–464.
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In the Gözütok & Brügge case, further to the requests for preliminary ruling 
by Belgian and German Courts, the ECJ nevertheless decided that out-of-court-
settlements did fall within the scope of application of Article 54 of the CISA. 
This decision is extensively reasoned. It is especially interesting here to point out 
that the ECJ explicitly links Article 54 of the CISA with the principle of mutual 
recognition. After the ECJ determined that the application of Article 54 of the CISA 
did not depend on harmonisation, at any rate bringing the criminal legislation of 
the Member States closer together in relation to the procedures for barring further 
prosecution, the ECJ held: 
In those circumstances, whether the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the 
CISA is applied to procedures whereby further prosecution is barred (regardless of whether 
a court is involved) or to judicial decisions, there is a necessary implication that the Member 
States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the 
criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be different 
if its own national law were applied.
Against this background, the application of Article 54 CISA to procedures to bar 
further prosecutions which were followed in another Member State without the 
intervention of a court does not depend on the condition that the criminal justice 
system of the first Member State does not require judicial intervention either. In this 
regard, the ECJ makes an explicit connection with the free movement of persons. 
If persons want to exercise this right effectively, they must be able to trust that 
decisions on the final barring of prosecution will be respected by other Member 
States. The reliance by a few Member States on the intention of the Member States 
that drafted the CISA is brushed aside with few words. According to the ECJ, 
such reliance already fails because of the mere fact that the documents supposedly 
evidencing this intention ‘(…) predate the Treaty of Amsterdam’s integration of 
the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.’
In this brief consideration of the judgment in the Gözütok & Brügge case, I 
do not intend to criticise the ECJ’s decision. On the contrary, precisely from the 
viewpoint of application of the principle of mutual recognition, a lot can be said in 
favour of a broad interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle in Article 54 of the 
CISA. It is in keeping with a Europe where the borders are being removed in the 
field of criminal law as well, and cooperation between the Member States in criminal 
matters is possible precisely because of this, that the legal protection of suspected 
or sentenced persons does not stop at the national borders. 12 The importance of 
12) Cf. J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘Case note’, Common Market Law Review 2004, p. 809 and W.B. van Bockel, 
The ne bis in idem principle in EU law, Amsterdam 2009, pp. 71–72.
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the judgment therefore lies in the fact that it demonstrates that the ECJ is willing 
to take the principle of mutual recognition – and related points of view such as the 
free movement of persons – as points of departure in the interpretation of Article 
54 of the CISA, and does not allow itself to be limited by the intention, different 
to a certain extent, of the parties that drafted the CISA.
5. EAW: ‘Staying’ and ‘Resident’
In 2008 and 2009, the ECJ deliberated twice – in respectively the Kozłowski and 
Wolzenburg cases – on requests for preliminary ruling essentially connected with 
an issue already brought up: the question of when a person is ‘staying’ in a Member 
State or is a ‘resident’, within the meaning of Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework 
Decision. In doing so, the ECJ also deliberated in the Kozłowski case on the 
uniform and autonomous interpretation of the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’. In 
this context, the ECJ took as a starting point that:
(…) it must be emphasised, (…) that the ground for optional non-execution stated in Article 
4(6) of the Framework Decision has in particular the objective of enabling the executing judicial 
authority to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s chances 
of reintegrating into society when the sentence imposed on him expires.
The terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’ are interpreted further from this point of view of 
resocialisation. ‘Staying’, for instance, refers to the situation ‘in which the person 
who is the subject of a European arrest warrant (…) has acquired, following a 
stable period of presence in that State, certain connections with that State which 
are of a similar degree to those resulting from residence.’ Whether this is the case 
depends on various points of view:
In order to determine whether, in a specific situation, there are connections between the 
requested person and the executing Member State which lead to the conclusion that that person 
is covered by the term ‘staying’ within the meaning of Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision, it 
is necessary to make an overall assessment of various objective factors characterising the situation 
of that person, which include, in particular, the length, nature and conditions of his presence 
and the family and economic connections which he has with the executing Member State.
Based on these points of view, the national court must decide whether ‘staying’ is 
involved in a specific case. 
It is interesting that the ECJ noted that ‘in their national law transposing 
Article 4(6), the Member States are not entitled to give those terms [‘resident’ and 
‘staying’; MJB] a broader meaning than that which derives from such a uniform 
interpretation.’ Broader apparently means: an interpretation that leads to refusal 
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of surrender sooner than it would have resulted on the basis of a uniform and 
autonomous interpretation. By saying this, the ECJ seems to imply that the op-
posite, a stricter interpretation that does not as easily result in refusal, is allowed. 
But the question can be raised whether that is indeed the case.13 The importance 
the ECJ attaches to reintegration in society and the overall assessment of various 
objective factors characterising the situation of the requested person give the 
impression in a certain sense that the court in the executing Member State may 
refuse to surrender a person for the purpose of execution only within this frame 
and may not derogate from that in any way. It could be argued further that it is 
actually incompatible with the importance of a uniform application of Union law 
and the principle of equal treatment to allow a different, stricter interpretation. 
Arguments against this are, however, conceivable. First of all, it could be argued 
that the optional nature of the non-execution ground laid down in Article 4(6) of 
the EAW Framework Decision actually comes down to a power to derogate. After 
all, if the power exists to completely omit a right to refuse surrender for the purpose 
of execution, it is difficult to see why the application of a ground for non-execution 
which is stricter than the uniform and autonomous interpretation of that ground 
for non-execution should not be allowed. An objection could nevertheless be that, 
according to the first lines of Article 4 of the EAW Framework Decision, it is not 
the Member State itself but the executing judicial authority of the Member State 
that decides whether or not to apply an optional ground for non-execution. An 
argument can be found in this to assume rather that it is not the national legislature 
that has a power to derogate. It is, after all, the court which in a specific case, based 
on the uniform and autonomous meaning of the terms used in the non-execution 
ground, must consider whether or not to apply that non-execution ground. 
There are even more relevant points of view and they too point in the direction 
of the discretion to give a stricter interpretation of the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’ 
which would not as easily lead to non-execution. According to the preamble, the 
framework decision is based on the principle of mutual recognition and is for the 
purpose of introducing a new and simplified system of surrender. The assumption 
is that European arrest warrants are to be executed, while non-execution depends 
on a limitative list of optional and mandatory grounds for non-execution. This is 
also expressed in other wording in the relevant legal bases (Article 31(1)(a and b) 
of the EU Treaty), which refers to ‘facilitating and accelerating cooperation’ and 
‘facilitating extradition’. A stricter interpretation, which would less easily lead to 
non-execution, is therefore not at odds with the purpose or the legal bases. This 
13) V. Glerum & K. Rozemond, ‘Surrender of Nationals’, in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), 
The European Arrest Warrant, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2009, pp. 83–84.
  109
Borgers / European Journal of Crime,  
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 18 (2010) 99–114
may well have been different if a significant place had been given in the preamble 
or otherwise to the importance of reintegration in society. In that case, such 
importance would have marked a clear boundary of the obligation to surrender, 
but it would also have been more logical to introduce a mandatory ground for 
non-execution. This is not altered by the way in which the ECJ formulates the 
rationale of Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework Decision in the Kozlowski 
judgment, precisely because that formulation (‘in particular’) expressed that the 
importance of reintegration in society is not the all-determining point of view. With 
this state of affairs, a stricter interpretation of Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework 
Decision seems to be allowed.
This issue was brought up as well in the Wolzenburg case.14 Various preliminary 
enquiries are discussed in the judgment in this case. Regarding the debate over 
allowing a stricter interpretation of Article 4(6) of the EAW Framework Decision 
or not, the following grounds of the ECJ are important:
57 The principle of mutual recognition, which underpins Framework Decision 2002/584, means 
that, in accordance with Article 1(2) thereof, the Member States are in principle obliged to 
act upon a European arrest warrant. Apart from the cases of mandatory non-execution laid 
down in Article 3 of the Framework Decision, the Member States may refuse to execute such 
a warrant only in the cases listed in Article 4 thereof (…).
58 It follows that a national legislature which, by virtue of the options afforded it by Article 4 of 
the Framework Decision, chooses to limit the situations in which its executing judicial authority 
may refuse to surrender a requested person merely reinforces the system of surrender introduced 
by that Framework Decision to the advantage of an area of freedom, security and justice.
It follow from this that the Member States have ‘a certain margin of discretion’ in 
executing Article 4 of the EAW Framework Decision. With respect to facilitating 
reintegration in society, the ECJ notes:
(…) although the ground for optional non-execution set out in Article 4(6) of the Framework 
Decision has (…) in particular the objective of enabling the executing judicial authority 
to give particular weight to the possibility of increasing the requested person’s chances of 
reintegrating into society when the sentence imposed on him expires (…), such an objective, 
while important, cannot prevent the Member States, when implementing that Framework 
Decision, from limiting, in a manner consistent with the essential rule stated in Article 1(2) 
thereof, the situations in which it is possible to refuse to surrender a person who falls within 
the scope of Article 4(6) thereof.’
14) ECJ, Case C-123/08, Wolzenburg, n.y.r.
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Briefly summarised, this means that an interpretation of Article 4(6) of the EAW 
Framework Decision which is stricter than the ECJ’s interpretation of it in the 
Kozłowski case, and thus less easily leads to non-execution, is allowed.15
It can be noted that the ECJ devotes few words to the shift of accent made 
in the Kozłowski and Wolzenburg cases. While reintegration in society was the 
guideline in determining the autonomous and uniform interpretation of Article 
4(6) of the EAW Framework in the former case, the first matter of importance in 
the latter case was that, in the light of the principle of mutual recognition, not 
applying this optional ground for non-execution, or applying it to a much lesser 
extent, is allowed. It is clear at any rate that the ECJ established a certain order 
of rank in these judgments: the importance of reintegration in society is not so 
compelling that it can block surrender, and is thus not an importance which, as it 
were, is higher in rank than the principle of mutual recognition. 
6. EAW: Enclosing Statutory Provisions
It can be illustrated on the basis of a recent Dutch case that a national court, when 
it interprets national law in the light of a framework decision aimed at mutual 
recognition, can be guided by the uniform and autonomous interpretation of 
terms from that framework decision, with the principle of mutual recognition as 
a guideline. What was this case about? If a Member State issues an EAW, under 
Article 8(1)(d) of the EAW Framework Decision, that EAW must set out ‘the 
nature and legal classification of the offence, particularly in respect of Article 2’. 
This Article 2 pertains to surrender on the basis of offences listed in the EAW. In 
the model EAW (section (e) of the annex to the EAW Framework Decision), not 
only the nature and legal classification of the offence must be set out, but also 
the applicable statutory provisions. The Dutch Surrender of Persons Act (OLW) 
refers to this model and provides in addition that an EAW must at any rate set 
out the nature and legal classification of the offence. So according to the letter of 
the framework decision and the Surrender of Persons Act, there is no obligation 
to submit the text of the applicable statutory provisions, in Dutch or translated 
into English.
In various judgments, the Amsterdam District Court (Rechtbank Amsterdam) 
nonetheless set the requirement that the texts of these statutory provisions indeed 
had to be submitted. The District Court used two connected arguments for setting 
this requirement: i. this requirement is explicitly mentioned by the government 
in parliamentary documents relating to the drafting of the Surrender of Persons 
15) See for another view on this issue the Opinion of Advocate-General Bot in the Wolzenburg case.
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Act, and ii. the text of the framework decision does not prevent this requirement 
from being set. The fact that the District Court considered itself obliged to carry 
out checks also seems connected with the observation that every now and then an 
issuing Member State sets out incorrect information in an EAW. 
The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) put an end to such administration 
of justice by the Amsterdam District Court. It gave four essential reasons for 
doing so: a. the text of the framework decision does not contain that obligation, 
b. the government’s position must be abandoned in the light of the obligation 
to interpret in conformity with framework decisions, as well as the fact that the 
Minister subsequently went back on that position, c. the principle of mutual 
recognition on which the EAW Framework Decision is based is not compatible 
with the aforementioned obligation, at any rate not in an unqualified form, and 
d. numerous other Member States do not set the requirement of submission of 
the texts of the applicable statutory provisions either.
The Dutch Supreme Court put forward arguments, clear and convincing in 
themselves against the District Court’s opinion. What is missing in the judgment, 
however, is that the underlying issue – concerning what review framework is avail-
able to the national courts in surrender cases – is placed in a broader context. In 
the light of the Kozłowski case, the central question should be whether a uniform 
and autonomous interpretation of Article 8(1)(d) of the EAW Framework Deci-
sion entails an obligation for the issuing Member State to submit the texts of the 
applicable statutory provisions. 
If my view is correct, no obligation can be read in Article 8(1)(d) of the EAW 
Framework Decision to submit the texts of the applicable statutory provisions. 
This is not the case first of all because neither the texts of those provisions nor the 
model EAW indicates the existence of such an obligation. Furthermore, it could 
be formulated as the rationale of Article 8(1)(d) of the EAW Framework Decision 
that the model EAW enables the executing Member State to judge whether a 
mandatory or optional ground for non-execution exists. These are issues such as 
amnesty, ne bis in idem, prescription and territoriality (Articles 3 and 4 of the EAW 
Framework Decision). For that judgment, mainly an adequate description of the 
circumstances under which the offence was committed is important and, to a lesser 
extent, the nature and legal classification of that offence. One could ask oneself 
what the added value is in this context of setting out – let alone submitting – the 
applicable statutory provisions. Strictly speaking, the executing Member States do 
not need them to determine whether there is a ground for non-execution.
Could an obligation to submit the texts of the applicable statutory provisions 
perhaps be derived from Article 2 of the EAW Framework Decision, which pertains 
to being able to review or not or setting the requirement of double punishability? 
If one has to do with an offence listed in the EAW, this offence ‘as defined by 
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the laws of the issuing Member State’ must come under one of the categories of 
offences listed in Article 2(2). It is logical for the issuing Member State to decide 
whether that is the case, given the explicit reference to the right of the issuing 
Member State. If a non-listed offence is concerned, the model EAW requires ‘full 
descriptions of the offence(s)’. Those descriptions must be adequate in order to 
enable the executing Member State to determine whether the offence for which 
the EAW was issued constitutes an offence under the law of the executing Member 
State. In that approach, submission of the texts of the provisions is not a necessary, 
standard requirement.
The question remains whether the executing Member State must have the texts 
of the applicable statutory provisions of the issuing Member State to be able to 
check whether the offence to which the EAW relates carries the maximum sentence 
as provided in Article 2(1) and (2) of the EAW Framework Decision. The question 
preceding this is whether the executing Member State is entitled to check this, and 
the purpose and tenor of the EAW Framework Decision are relevant to this. The 
EAW Framework Decision introduced a surrender system based on the principle of 
mutual recognition. This gives that system a largely mandatory nature. Surrender is 
the rule, and non-surrender is possible only on the basis of the limitative grounds 
for non-execution included in the framework decision. Although it is stated in 
the preamble of the framework decision that decisions on execution of the EAW 
may be taken only after they have been subjected to sufficient controls, at the 
same time, the framework decision is based on a high degree of trust between 
the Member States. In this approach, trust is not a result, but rather the standard 
point of departure for cooperation, as is evident from the Gözütok & Brügge case 
law. Different opinions can be formed on the answer to the question whether 
mutual trust can actually be created by imposing legal rules. This does not affect 
the fact that it is not appropriate for a system based on mutual recognition and 
mutual trust for an executing Member State to systematically check the work of 
the issuing Member State.16
All in all, an autonomous and uniform interpretation of Article 8(1)(d) of the 
EAW Framework Decision does not seem to leave room for assuming an obligation 
16) Klip, 2009, pp. 339. See on this issue also J. Ginter, ‘The content of a European Arrest Warrant’, 
in N. Keijzer & E. van Sliedregt (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 
2009, pp. 8–10. Ginter argues that providing the full text of the articles containing the legal classifica-
tion of the offence in a European Arrest Warrant in view of Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. However, the European Court of Human Rights requires that the arrested person 
must be informed (in non-technical language) on the essential legal grounds for his arrest. This not 
stipulated, by definition, the obligation to submit the texts of the applicable statutory provisions.
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to submit the texts of the applicable statutory provisions. If such a requirement 
were set nevertheless, an unacceptable broader interpretation would be used. 
7. Conclusion and Outlook
At the beginning of this article, I stated that when framework decisions are drafted 
which relate to cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, the 
principle of mutual recognition is not always used as a mandatory guideline. When 
framework decisions are implemented at national level, the national rules may be 
drafted in such a way that the obligation to cooperate is less effective or mandatory 
than would be the case on the basis of a framework decision, in view of the principle 
of mutual recognition. Against this backdrop, the ECJ fulfils a role that cannot be 
underestimated. It is clear that the ECJ considers the principle of mutual recogni-
tion of paramount importance. This principle is therefore an important if not the 
most important guideline for giving a uniform and autonomous interpretation 
of provisions of European law. Because the ECJ is the pre-eminent authority to 
interpret European law, this working method also has a consequential effect on 
national courts. National courts may also be expected to search for the uniform 
and autonomous meaning of terms in framework decisions in complying with 
their obligation to interpret national law in conformity with framework decisions, 
and to give particular weight to the principle of mutual recognition in doing so.
To what extent will the Treaty of Lisbon change this state of affairs? It can be 
noted first of all that all existing framework decisions will remain in effect.17 Sub-
sequently, albeit after some years have passed,18 the restrictions in the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ as they apply pursuant to Article 35 EU Treaty will cease to exist and 
make room for the powers of the ECJ in Article 259 et seq. of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. This means for example that the restrictions 
set in Article 35 EU Treaty on requests for preliminary rulings will cease to exist. 
All national courts will have the competence – and the highest national courts the 
obligation – to request preliminary rulings if they are necessary in order to give 
judgment in national proceedings. This will most likely entail an increase in the 
number of requests for preliminary rulings on the interpretation of framework 
decisions (and other legal instruments) relating to mutual recognition.
17) Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions, Article 9.
18) According to Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions, Article 10, this transitional measure shall 
cease to have effect five years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Furthermore, 
the amendment of a framework decision shall entail the applicability of the powers of the Court 
of Justice as set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with respect to this 
amended framework decision.
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Another important issue is the competence of the European Union to determine 
measures pertaining to mutual recognition in criminal matters. The legal instru-
ment for this purpose will no longer be the framework decision, but the directive. 
If one considers the legal principles of Articles 82 and 83 of the Treaty on the 
operation of the European Union, it appears that harmonisation of legislation 
will be carried out first and foremost to enable effective and efficient cooperation 
between the Member States in criminal matters. In this respect, the principle 
of mutual recognition is misleading. This will continue a development that has 
already been in progress for some time: the shift of attention more and more from 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure of 
the Member States to harmonisation with a view to cooperation in criminal mat-
ters.19 The recent Stockholm Programme confirms that this development has by 
no means come to an end. According to this Programme, the principle of mutual 
recognition should extend to all types of court decisions and judgments – civil, 
criminal or administrative. Various proposals are made in that context to expand 
the current legislation in this area.20
Let there be no misunderstanding, therefore, that the Treaty of Lisbon, owing 
to the reinforcement of the rules on preliminary rulings as well as the prominent 
position given to the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, entails 
that national courts will have to take increasingly more account of the meaning of 
that principle in the interpretation of national rules having their origin in European 
law in the area of cooperation in criminal matters.
19) M.J. Borgers, ‘Functions and aims of harmonisation after the Lisbon Treaty: a European 
perspective’, in C. Fijnaut & J. Ouwerkerk (eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010.
20) Council Document 14449/09.
